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Introduction
This edition marks the Quarterly Bulletin’s 50th anniversary.
TheBulletin originally sprang into existence in 1960, the
product of a series of recommendations by the Radcliffe
Committee.  Up until the advent of the Inflation Report in
1993, it was the main route through which the Bank
communicated its assessment of the economic environment.
It remains one of the Bank’s flagship publications, providing
an assessment of recent developments in financial markets
as well as medium-term analytical research.(2) On its
50th birthday, this article reviews the history of the Bulletin,
how it has evolved, and the insight it has provided into the
Bank’s thinking on key central banking issues.
The article is structured as follows.  The first section examines
briefly the Bulletin’s origins.  The next two sections examine its
coverage of some of the key central banking issues of the past
50 years, through both the economic commentary and the
companion articles and speeches.  The fourth section then
looks at how the Bulletin has evolved over time, both in terms
of content and style.
The origins of the Quarterly Bulletin
The Quarterly Bulletinfirst appeared in response to a
recommendation from the Radcliffe Committee in 1959.(3)
The Committee — appointed to investigate the workings of the
monetary and credit system — found that there was ‘scope for
more regular comment by the authorities on monetary and
financial affairs’.(4) The Bank was therefore invited to ‘give
consideration to…the issue of a quarterly bulletin in which
could appear either some of the more technical discussions of
monetary issues or signed articles on more controversial
matters’.
The Bank had anticipated this recommendation.  Internal
discussions about the shape of a prospective regular
publication had begun as early as 1958.  This work examined
questions such as the publication’s potential audience, its
frequency, the attribution of the articles and its relationship to
government publications already in existence.  In doing so, it
drew heavily on the experience of other central banks — such
as the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank — and of
commercial banks in producing their own publications.  The
proposals were taken up with varying degrees of enthusiasm
by the Bank’s directors, but by the time the Radcliffe
recommendations emerged, much of the work was already in
place.
By the end of 1960, the Bank was in a position to produce its
first edition of the new Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.(5)
The aims were twofold (Cairncross (1985)).  First, it was
intended to provide regular official comment on current
monetary and financial developments, including through the
publication of a broader set of economic statistics.  And,
second, it was intended to encourage research both inside the
Bank and by others outside.  The first edition included an
economic commentary, an analysis of banking and exchequer
statistics, an article on ‘the financial surplus of the private
sector’, the Governor’s Mansion House speech and a statistical
annex.  It was well received although it remains unknown
whether its editors at the time would have expected it still to
be here some 50 years later.
The Bulletin’s assessment
At the outset, the Bulletin’s economic commentary was the
prime route through which the Bank presented its policy
analysis and assessment of current events to a wider audience.
In retrospect, successive Bulletin commentaries also provide an
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insight into how the Bank saw its own role, and its relationship
with government and markets.  During this period, the Bank
had no statutory policy responsibility or objective but carried
out a number of functions.  It was an adviser to government,
especially on monetary policy;  it managed the government’s
borrowing programme and the foreign exchange reserves;  it
implemented monetary policy;  and it had a general interest in
the structure and ‘orderly’ operation of financial markets.  The
Bank had expertise in each of these areas and its views
mattered, both to government and markets.  How far it felt it
safe to publish these views in the Bulletin was a judgement and
depended on the mood and circumstances of the day.
Living with fixed exchange rates
On occasion the Bank could be robust.  In the period before
the 1967 devaluation, the Bulletin chronicled the various steps
taken to narrow the current deficit.  These included both
quantitative and qualitative forms of credit control,(1) which
the Bank justified as ‘an earnest of the Government’s
resolution to maintain the exchange rate for sterling’.(2) Aware
of contrary views, the Bank added ‘this does not mean that the
pound has been defended at the expense of the domestic
economy:  but rather that, given the extent of the nation’s
present ability and willingness to produce, we could not afford
all we were doing’.
The effort, however, proved insufficient and the pound was
devalued in November 1967.  ‘Devaluation’ commented the
Bank, ‘is in itself no solution…it requires, even more urgently
than before, if this be possible, both that efficient production
at home shall increase and that home demands which are not
immediately essential to a rise in productivity shall be
restrained…the potential advantages of devaluation will be
lost if wage costs rise, so success also turns on the patience
with which hardships in the form of higher prices and
taxation…are tolerated’.(3) 
Sterling remained on a fixed parity, at its new lower level, and
the Bulletin’s emphasis on wages, productivity and the current
account persisted for several more years.  In June 1969, for
example, it was ‘essential that policy manifestly continues to
give priority to obtaining the necessary improvement in the
balance of payments’.(4) And in mid-1970, the Bank described
the upward trend in domestic incomes and costs as
‘disturbing’, noting that ‘it remains to be seen how far
improvements in productivity will relieve these pressures’.(5)
By the end of 1970, the Bank’s focus was more explicitly on
inflation:  ‘wage and price increases at current rates present
grave economic and social problems at home’.(6) However,
‘to cure the present inflation solely by restricting demand
would be likely to involve very high costs in terms of
unemployment, bankruptcies and falling output’.  Accordingly,
‘it remains a major priority to moderate the growth of
incomes’.(7)
Living with inflation
Sterling was floated in June 1972 with the Bulletin reporting a
loss of reserves of over £1,000 million over the previous six
working days.  The Bulletin attributed the speculative attack to
concerns about how recent developments — such as the
movements in domestic wages and prices — might affect the
United Kingdom’s future balance of payments.(8)
The following years, however, saw a new source of cost
pressure from abroad.  The surge in global commodity prices in
1972–74 triggered a sharp deterioration in the
United Kingdom’s current account position.  Non-oil
commodity prices started to rise from late 1971 — accelerating
from mid-1972 — and oil prices quadrupled in late 1973.  In
classic Bank parlance, the rise in commodity prices was
deemed ‘particularly unwelcome’ for the Government’s
counterinflationary policies.(9)
Also of significance, however, was the impact on the country’s
balance of payments.  Rising commodity prices were
estimated to account for the majority of the deterioration in
the current account between the first half of 1972 and late
1973, as a substantial non-oil deficit emerged.(10) And the
surge in oil prices led to a further widening of the current
account deficit, from a quarterly rate of £660 million in the
fourth quarter of 1973 to almost £1 billion in the first quarter
of 1974 (Bank of England (1974a)).  The prospect of exporting
North Sea oil meant that the UK economy was deemed
‘favourably placed’ in the longer term, but the non-oil deficit
meant the near-term situation was less favourable.(11) The
Governor at the time — Gordon Richardson — stated that
there ‘is no doubt that this non-oil deficit must be corrected as
soon as possible’ (Richardson (1974)).
Initially, however, concern appeared unwarranted as the larger
current account deficit was financed without undue difficulty
during the first half of 1974.  But pressures started to build
during 1975 as the ongoing deficit proved increasingly hard to
finance, with sterling depreciating substantially over the year
and official reserves being drawn down.  In June 1976, the G10
and Switzerland, together with the Bank for International
Settlements, announced a $5.3 billion short-term credit
facility made available to the Bank ‘in the common interest of
the stability and efficient functioning of the international
monetary system’.(12) But by September, and with sterling
falling further, the Bank warned that ‘the problems faced by
(1) Bank of England (1966a), page 3.
(2) Bank of England (1966b), page 220.
(3) Bank of England (1967), page 336.
(4) Bank of England (1969a), page 144.
(5) Bank of England (1970a), page 135.
(6) Bank of England (1970b), page 400.
(7) Bank of England (1971a), page 166.
(8) Bank of England (1972a), pages 325–26.
(9) Bank of England (1973a), page 127.
(10) Bank of England (1973b), page 410.
(11) Bank of England (1974a), page 134.
(12) Bank of England (1976a), page 163.260 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
this country with regard to inflation and the balance of
payments are especially severe’.(1) These problems proved too
severe for the country to deal with unaided and the
Government applied to the IMF for a stand-by credit.
The December 1976 Bulletin went to print in an atmosphere of
crisis.  ‘At the time of writing (8th December), the reaction of
the Government to the present situation is still under
consideration.  But in general it is clear that circumstances
limit the room in which economic policy can manoeuvre…we
face a year more of restraint and retrenchment.’(2) Tight
monetary targets were urged, with particular emphasis on
domestic credit expansion.  But on the brighter side, the
Bulletin observed that, unlike other countries, the
United Kingdom could look forward to its own source of oil. 
Living with monetary aggregates
Subsequently, inflation rates improved gradually as wage and
price controls took hold and sterling appreciated, partly in
response to North Sea oil.  In addition, tight control of banking
balance sheets — including through the ‘corset’ — improved at
least the appearance of the monetary statistics.
Inflation rebounded, however, in 1980 following the unwinding
of wage controls and a further pickup in the oil price.  The
withdrawal of the corset also led to a return to bank
intermediation of credit, contributing to above-target growth
in broad money.  And yet, as the Assessment pointed out at
some length in December 1980, the behaviour of sterling M3
‘has probably not adequately reflected the stringency of
financial conditions’, which were putting considerable
pressures on industry and had been effective in slowing
inflation.(3) In large part, the counterinflationary pressure was
coming from the appreciating real exchange rate.  But the
Bulletin also devoted considerable space to explaining the
overshoot in the monetary data, which remained at that time
the official measure of the monetary policy stance.  The Bank
was, however, careful to stress that this was not the only factor
— ‘monetary policy has thus continued to have to pay regard
to a range of considerations:  the target aggregate, sterling M3,
and the other monetary aggregates, as well as the exchange
rate, the rate of inflation and developments in the economy
affecting them’.(4)
The 1992 sterling ERM crisis 
Through much of the 1980s there was discussion of
sterling’s entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
And even while sterling was outside the system, shadowing
policies were sometimes pursued to provide a nominal
anchor for expectations.  Sterling finally joined the ERM on
8 October 1990.  Under the terms of entry, sterling was
allowed to fluctuate against other currencies in a band of ±6%
around a set of agreed bilateral central rates.(5) Membership of
the ERM was expected to reinforce the authorities’
counterinflationary strategy and to provide greater stability to
help businesses to plan and invest.(6) The Bank warned that
‘companies can have no grounds for expecting a lower
exchange rate to validate any failure to control costs’, warning
that ‘if they fail to recognise the constraints under which they
now operate, the outcome will prove painful for them’.(7)
There were few signs of any tension within the ERM during
1991 despite contrasting moves in interest rates across
member countries.  But pressures increased during the first
half of 1992 as the Bundesbank attempted to quell building
inflationary pressure emerging from reunification.  High
interest rates in Germany obliged other countries ‘to
maintain higher interest rates than domestic considerations
would, for the most part, have dictated’, making it difficult for
UK authorities to ease policy further in response to the
persistent weakness in output.(8) Nevertheless, even in May,
the tensions were not yet perceived to be ‘serious’.
The situation deteriorated further in the second half of the
year.  The Bundesbank raised its discount rate in mid-July and
the negative vote in the Danish referendum on the
Maastricht Treaty increased tensions within the ERM.  Sterling
came under pressure throughout July and August as concerns
built about the prospect of a ‘no’ vote in the French
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, due to be held on
20 September.  The August Bulletin noted these ‘strains’ within
the ERM, but emphasised the importance of the credibility
derived from the authorities’ macroeconomic policies.(9)
Tensions came to a head on 16 September when sterling
fell towards its floor.(10) The Bank intervened to support
the currency and there were two announced increases in
interest rates.  But the measures proved insufficient and with
the cost of supporting the currency becoming prohibitive, the
only appropriate action was to suspend sterling’s membership
of the ERM.  The costs were substantial — both financially
and in terms of the credibility of the authorities’
counterinflationary policies.  Robin Leigh-Pemberton — the
Governor at the time — described sterling’s exit as ‘a shock;  it
was a shock to confidence;  and it was a shock to a framework
for monetary policy which had become highly visible and
easily understood’.(11)
The sterling ERM crisis marked a watershed in UK monetary
policy.  Immediately after exit, the Chancellor announced the
introduction of an inflation target and Leigh-Pemberton
(1) Bank of England (1976b), page 297.
(2) Bank of England (1976c), page 419.
(3) Bank of England (1980), page 406.
(4) Bank of England (1981), page 452.
(5) The ERM is described further in Adams (1990).
(6) Leigh-Pemberton (1990), page 483.
(7) Bank of England (1990), page 439.
(8) Bank of England (1992a), page 125.
(9) Bank of England (1992b), pages 241 and 244.
(10) The events of the day are described on an hour-by-hour basis in the ‘Operation of
monetary policy’ section of the November 1992 Bulletin (Bank of England (1992c)).
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emphasised the importance that ‘the authorities are not
perceived as taking their eye off their counterinflationary
duty’.(1) The crisis also marked a watershed for the Bulletin —
the Chancellor accompanied the announcement with an
invitation for the Bank to produce a regular report on the
progress being made towards the inflation target.  With the
advent of this ‘Inflation Report’, the general assessment section
of the Bulletin ceased to exist, more than 30 years after it was
first introduced.
Evolution of central banking
The role of the Bulletin is, however, broader than the
assessment of current economic or financial developments.
The research and analysis contained within the articles in the
Bulletin has been one of the mainstays of the publication.
Some of these — such as ‘The use of quill, patent and steel
pens by the Bank of England during the nineteenth century’
(Bank of England (1972b)) — have perhaps been somewhat
tangential to core central banking.  But, in general, these
articles, supplemented with the speeches and working papers
covered in the Bulletin, provide a rich stream of thought with
which to monitor how key central banking issues have evolved.
Two such examples of these are the role of money within the
monetary policy framework and the Bank’s official operations
in sterling money markets.
The role of money 
The importance of money within the monetary policy
framework was one of the highest profile economic debates
of the 20th century.  The strength of the long-run relationship
between money growth and inflation is now widely
accepted.(2) But that was not the case at the end of
World War II, when the role of monetary policy was perceived
to be largely to manage the exchange rate and thereby the
balance of trade.  It was not until later that inflation was
understood to be ‘always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon’ (Friedman (1963)).  Indeed, during the 1960s,
the Bulletin was largely silent on the role of money, at least in
terms of analytical contributions.(3) That is not to say,
however, that work was not progressing internally.  In 1966, for
example, an article on money was scheduled for publication
but was culled late on in the process (Capie (2010)).
It was not until the 1970s that the Bank started to engage
publicly with the debate surrounding monetarism.  The
seminal work — ‘The importance of money’ — was published
in the Bulletin in 1970 (Goodhart and Crockett (1970)).  This
examined closely the distinguishing features of the
‘monetarist’ and ‘Keynesian’ theories on the role of money,
highlighting the importance of the demand for money.  It then
went on to estimate money demand functions, an approach
that was extended in a number of subsequent Bulletin articles
during the remainder of the 1970s (see, for example,
Price (1972), Hacche (1974) and Coghlan (1978)).
Attention also shifted during the 1970s to the potential role for
targets for money growth in controlling inflation.  The British
Government first began publishing targets for money growth
in 1976.  Commenting on these in a speech in 1977, then
Governor of the Bank — Gordon Richardson — stated that ‘the
best way of giving a clear indication of the thrust of monetary
policy is to state quantitative aims for the rate of expansion of
one or more of the monetary aggregates’ (Richardson (1977)).
The focus on monetary targets increased following the election
of the Thatcher Government in 1979 and, in particular, the
introduction of target ranges for broad money as the sole
intermediate target in the Medium Term Financial Strategy
(MTFS) in 1980.  Somewhat paradoxically, analytical
contributions on money in the Bulletinfell back over this
period.  But that is perhaps unsurprising — the political
prominence and economic relevance of broad money meant it
became instead a key focus of the economic commentary.
By the mid-1980s, however, doubts were growing about
whether monetary targets continued to serve a useful purpose.
In a speech in 1986, Governor Robin Leigh-Pemberton
commented that the relationship between the rate of growth
of broad money and the rate of growth of nominal incomes
had become increasingly unpredictable (Leigh-Pemberton
(1986)).  He attributed this to the rapid pace of financial
change during the 1980s and raised the question about
whether it might not be better to dispense with a target for
broad money, something that was subsequently done in the
1987/88 MTFS.(4)
Having played only a supporting role during the
United Kingdom’s membership of the ERM, money growth
once again rose in prominence following sterling’s exit, with
the announcement of medium-term monitoring ranges for
both M4 and M0.  Articles on money began to appear with
some regularity in the Bulletin.  Most of these began to focus
on money growth at a more disaggregated (sectoral) level,
identifying factors that were influencing the money holdings of
households, companies or other financial corporations.(5)
Some articles — on ‘divisia money’ — explored the weights
that should be placed on different components of money
according to their use in transactions (Janssen (1996) and
Hancock (2005)).  And other articles explored the information
that money and credit might contain as a guide to real and
nominal trends two to three years ahead (Astley and Haldane
(1997)) — a topic originally explored in the Bulletin back in
(1) Leigh-Pemberton (1992), page 459.
(2) See, for example, the evidence in King (2002) and Benati (2005).
(3) The exception came in 1969, when an article was published on the concept of
‘domestic credit expansion’, which was viewed as superior to the rate of growth of
money supply as an indicator of monetary conditions (Bank of England (1969b)).
While analytical articles were few and far between, the economic commentary
consistently referred to money and credit growth throughout the period. 
(4) Illustrative targets remained for the narrower M0 measure. 
(5) See, for example, Salmon (1995), Thomas (1996), Brigden et al (2000), or
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1970 (Crockett (1970)) — or the role of money and credit in an
inflation-targeting regime (Hauser and Brigden (2002)).
The contributions contained within the Quarterly Bulletin do,
of course, represent just one small part of the vast academic
literature on the role of money.  Nevertheless, as this potted
history has demonstrated, leafing through the pages of the
50 years of Bulletins can provide an interesting insight into
how the analysis of the role of money has evolved within the
central banking community.
The Bank’s role in the money markets
The Bank’s operations in the sterling money markets are the
means by which the Bank both implements monetary policy
and reduces the cost of disruption to the liquidity and
payment services supplied by commercial banks.
Consequently, these operations lie at the heart of central
banking.  The framework governing the Bank’s operations can
be split into three broad periods during the Bulletin’s lifetime:
up to 1981;  1981–2006;  and post-2006 (including the
financial crisis).  Other reforms during the period — notably
those in 1971 and 1996–97 — were largely operational and left
the conceptual framework in place at the time little altered.
Throughout these reforms, the Quarterly Bulletin has acted as
a record of both the changes and the motivations underlying
them.  It is of course impossible to do justice to this history in
just a few paragraphs;  this section aims merely to provide a
brief overview.(1)
Prior to 1981, the Bank operated what was referred to as the
‘classical’ system.(2) Each week, a money market ‘shortage’
was created by the Bank issuing slightly more Treasury bills
than necessary for the Treasury’s needs (Bank of England
(1963)).  Discount houses — specialist intermediaries in the
short-term money market — thereby needed to come to the
Bank for funds, which the Bank would make available at the
appropriate policy rate.  In this framework, it was this lending
facility that determined market rates;  other open market
operations (in which the Bank dealt in the market on a
multilateral basis) were secondary, aiming merely to offset
other ‘autonomous’ factors that might affect the amount
discount houses needed to borrow.
A series of reforms was introduced during the 1970s to
increase the focus on interest rates rather than quantitative
controls in monetary policy (Bank of England (1971b,c)).  But
the underlying framework governing the Bank’s money market
operations remained the same.  From 1972, the policy rate was
replaced with a Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), which was
linked initially to the Treasury bill rate but was later
administered.  The requirement on clearing banks to hold a
certain proportion of their deposit liabilities as cash or
high-quality assets was extended to cover all banks.  And
clearing banks were required to agree to end their collective
agreements on interest rates.(3)
By the end of the 1970s, however, further (more fundamental)
reforms were felt necessary.  These stemmed in part from a
desire to allow market factors a greater role in determining the
structure of short-term interest rates and the need for greater
flexibility to deal with higher and more volatile inflation
(Bank of England (1982)).  But more significantly, while the
case for moving to a system aimed at controlling the
monetary base was eventually rejected by the Government,
new money market arrangements were necessary to leave
open a move in that direction.(4)
The reforms in 1981 emphasised the role of open market
operations relative to the Bank’s lending facility.  The abolition
of the reserve asset ratio (liquidity) requirement relieved
clearing banks of the requirement to hold excess balances at
the Bank of England.  Instead, discount houses would use the
Bank’s open market operations to bid for the amount judged
necessary solely for market participants to avoid the penal
charges incurred if their balances at the Bank went overdrawn.
The Bank ceased to continually post an MLR;  interest rates
were determined by market forces based on the aggregate
supply and demand of balances at the Bank, with the Bank
intervening only when rates went outside an unpublished
band.  But from 1985, the Bank did once again, from time to
time, announce an MLR at which discount houses could
borrow from the Bank in an operation later in the day.  And the
introduction of inflation targeting in 1992 along with the
regular interest rate meetings between the Chancellor and the
Governor — the ‘Ken and Eddie show’ — meant that the
authorities were setting interest rates overtly rather than
leaving it to the market.
By the mid-1990s, further reforms were required (Bank of
England (1997, 1998)) to address concerns that the limited
scope of the operations allowed a few market participants to
influence overnight interest rates disproportionately.  First, the
pool of eligible collateral was extended to include the
newly developed gilt repo market.(5) Second, the range of
counterparties was extended to include banks and securities
dealers as well as the discount houses.  And, third, the late-day
(penal rate) lending facility was made available to all
settlement banks, rather than just the discount houses.  These
reforms were supplemented in 2001 with an overnight deposit
facility, thereby creating a ‘corridor’ for market interest rates.
In 2003, however, the Governor announced a review of the
Bank’s money market operations ‘with a view to improving and
simplifying them’ (King (2003)).  The existing system was
complex and the two-week maturity of the open market
(1) For further detail, see Chapters 6, 9, 10 and 13 of Capie (2010) or Tucker (2004).
(2) See, for example, page 213 of Coleby (1983).
(3) These reforms are discussed further in Davies et al (2010).
(4) For further discussion of the monetary base control debate, see Foot et al (1979).
(5) Gilt repo operations had been used previously, for example during the ERM crisis in
1992.  For further discussion of the gilt repo market, see Bank of England (1996).Research and analysis The history of the Quarterly Bulletin 263
operations could lead to an unusual interest rate maturity
structure around the time of policy rate changes.  In addition,
although market interest rates were kept broadly in line with
the policy rate on average, overnight interest rates were highly
volatile by international standards and could still be influenced
by some counterparties, thereby discouraging participation.
The reforms of 2006 returned the standing (lending and
deposit) facilities to pre-eminence as the means through which
overnight interest rates were set.(1) Banks agreed to hold a
specified positive balance with the Bank on average over a
maintenance period lasting from one Monetary Policy
Committee meeting to the next.  The level of ‘reserves
balances’ targeted was chosen by individual banks and, for the
first time ever, remunerated at the Bank’s official policy rate.
Weekly open market operations were used to ensure that the
demand for reserves was met in aggregate.  Standing lending
and deposit facilities were made available for banks to access
at any time, priced to create a corridor around the official
policy rate.  These arrangements ensured that, through
arbitrage, overnight interest rates should remain around the
middle of the corridor over the maintenance period in line
with Bank Rate (Mac Gorain (2005)).
The framework was adapted further during the recent
financial crisis in response to significant changes to financial
and monetary conditions.(2) These adjustments are discussed
further on pages 292–301 of this Bulletin and so will not be
discussed at length here.  In brief, however, the introduction of
asset purchases (also known as ‘quantitative easing’) led to the
suspension of reserves targets, with all reserves remunerated
at Bank Rate.  In addition, a number of liquidity insurance
facilities were introduced.  These included long-term (initially
three-month) repo operations against a wider-than-normal
pool of collateral, and a US dollar facility to address strains in
term money markets and dollar markets.  The Bank also
introduced the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) and,
subsequently, the Discount Window Facility (DWF) to allow
banks to exchange illiquid collateral for UK Treasury bills or
gilts for a fee.(3) Of these, both the SLS and US dollar facility
were intended as temporary measures whereas the DWF and
the extended-collateral long-term repos are intended to be
permanent features.  The prospective shape of the sterling
monetary framework is examined further in the article by
Clews, Salmon and Weeken on pages 292–301 of this Bulletin,
continuing the Bulletin’s tradition of documenting the Bank’s
role in sterling money markets.
The Bulletin’s evolution
The Quarterly Bulletin has evolved continually to reflect the
changing nature of the Bank and its communication needs.  In
some instances, that has reflected changes in content, as when
the Inflation Report was first introduced in 1993.  But on other
occasions it has reflected changes in style, design or method of
communication.  This section reviews how the Bulletin has
evolved over time.
Structure and content 
Despite its age, the backbone of the Bulletin remains similar to
that in the first edition in December 1960 (Table A).  Research
articles continue to form a core part of the Bulletin.  And, while
the nature of the report may have shifted over time, there has
been a consistent focus on recent developments in financial
markets throughout the history of the Bulletin.
But there have been some notable changes in the Bulletin’s
structure over time.  Perhaps most noteworthy is the shift
away from publishing commentary or assessment of recent
economic developments.  For many years, this was the
highest-profile section within the Bulletin, representing as it
did the easiest (and, often, only) way to understand the Bank’s
thinking on the issues of the day.  But following the
introduction of inflation targeting in 1992 and the requirement
on the Bank to produce a quarterly ‘Inflation Report’, this part
of the Bulletin was stripped out, leaving the Bulletin to focus
solely on recent financial and, for a time, international
developments.
A second notable change was the cessation of the statistical
annex in 1997 as these figures moved across to form part of
the Bank’s new Monetary and Financial Statistics publication.
On one level, this marked a clear departure from one of the
original purposes of the Bulletin:  to provide regular financial
statistics.  But it was actually aligned with the original thinking
of the Radcliffe Committee, which had never envisaged the
Bulletin including these statistics, favouring instead a separate
‘Digest of Monetary and Financial Statistics’.  Nevertheless, the
removal of the statistical annex altered the nature of the
Bulletin, increasing the share devoted to more medium-term
analytical research.
(1) See Bank of England (2004a,b), Tucker (2004) and Clews (2005).
(2) See Cross, Fisher and Weeken (2010) or Clews, Salmon and Weeken (2010).
(3) For further discussion of the Bank’s collateral risk management framework, see
Breeden and Whisker (2010).
Table A Structure of the Quarterly Bulletin




Financial market commentary(c)   
Research and analytical articles   
Full speeches(d)   
Speech summaries 
Working paper summaries 
Statistical annex 
(a) During 1993, the summary formed the introduction to the Inflation Report but from 1994 it covered the
main content of the Quarterly Bulletin.
(b) While the commentary on the domestic economy ended following the publication of the Inflation Report in
1993, the Bulletin continued to contain a section on international economic developments up until 2001.
(c) The commentary on financial markets was dropped for three editions in 1997 before being reintroduced.
(d) Only selected speeches were published in early editions.264 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
Other changes to the Bulletin have perhaps been less
prominent but have, nevertheless, marked important stages in
the Bulletin’s evolution.  The emergence of the information age
placed a premium on the Bulletin being easily digestible for
readers who had increasing access to vast swathes of research.
From 1993, a summary was introduced (later evolving into a
foreword authored by the Bank’s Chief Economist) that
allowed a busy reader to grasp quickly the key points.  And
summaries of Bank of England working papers were introduced
in 2001, thereby allowing easy access to the breadth of the
Bank’s research.  More recently, the immediacy with which
speeches have become available — both through media and
the internet — has nullified the need to replicate speeches in
full in the Bulletin;  instead, short summaries were made
available from 2008.  This contrasted with earlier years, where
the Bulletin could sometimes represent the first opportunity
readers would have had to read Bank speeches.
Style and publication 
Over the years, a great deal of care and consideration has gone
into the design and production of the Bank’s publications.  The
Bulletin has gone through various incarnations, as shown by
the selection of front covers in Figure 1, but it remains the
same clearly branded product that it was back in 1960.  Boxes
— now an important part of the Bulletin — were introduced
from 1981, thereby allowing standalone parts of the analysis to
be separated out from the main text.  And it was not until
1992 that colour was first introduced into the Bulletin.
Changes in design were accompanied by changes in
communication techniques.  When the Bulletin was first
introduced in 1960, it was freely available and the print run
quickly soared, from around 5,000 per issue in early editions to
approaching 20,000 per issue towards the end of the 1970s
(Chart 1).  But these numbers were unsustainable without
charges being brought in to cover printing costs.  These were
introduced in the early 1980s and circulation fell back sharply,
to numbers comparable to those in the early 1960s.
Circulation was then steady for much of the 1980s before
falling back from the mid-1990s as copies became more widely
available on the internet.  Indeed, internet downloads have
soared in recent years as the Bank has shifted towards greater
use of electronic communication.
The future of the Bulletin
The Bank places great premium on the effectiveness of its
communication, and seeks continually for ways to make
improvements (see, for example, Aikman et al (2010)).  Over
the past 50 years, the Quarterly Bulletin has been a key
conduit through which external observers can gain an insight
into the Bank’s thinking, and never more so than during the
recent financial crisis.  The Bulletin has evolved during that
time, adapting to new responsibilities and new technologies.
But the same rigour and analysis that underpinned the original














Chart 1 Quarterly Bulletin circulation(a)
(a) The data are based on past internal papers;  gaps occur where the data are incomplete.
(b) Includes complimentary copies and all UK and overseas paid and concessionary subscribers
who receive the Bulletin when it is released.
(c) Average number of downloads for each issue within a calendar year.  A download is recorded
if somebody chooses to download either the full Bulletin or an individual article.  So the
numbers may distort the number of individual readers.
Figure 1 Selection of past covers of the Quarterly Bulletin
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